Chapter 3

Block Ciphers and the Data Encryption Standard

Modern Block Ciphers

- will now look at modern block ciphers
- one of the most widely used types of cryptographic algorithms
- provide secrecy and/or authentication services
- in particular will introduce DES (Data Encryption Standard)
- For easier understanding we will first introduce "Simplified DES" – S-DES

S-DES Overview

- S-DES is a block-cipher taking 8-bit blocks of plaintext, converting them to 8-bit blocks of ciphertext
- S-DES uses a 10-bit key for encryption and uses the same key for decryption as well
- S-DES encrypts in 2 stages, plus an initial permutation (IP) and a final permutation (IP⁻¹).
- At each stage, a function f_k performs complex substitution and permutation of thre data in conjunction with the key.
- Between stages, the left half and the right half of the data are swapped by a switch function (SW)







Figure 3.1 Simplified DES Scheme

S-DES Key Generation

- From the original 10-bit key, a different 8bit key is generated for each stage
- The function P10 permutes the 10 bits: P10: Bit 3, 5, 2, 7, 4, 10, 1, 9, 8, 6
- The function LS-n does a circular left shift of each 5-bit half key by n bits
- The function P8 selects 8 of the 10 bits: P8: Bit 6, 3, 7, 4, 8, 5, 10, 9




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Figure 3.2 Key Generation for Simplified DES

S-DES Encryption Algorithm

- The initial and final permutations are: IP: Bit 2, 6, 3, 1, 4, 8, 5, 7 IP⁻¹: Bit 4, 1, 3, 5, 7, 2, 8, 6
- f_K works on the left half L and right half R of the data block according to:
 f_K(L,R)=(L⊕F(R, K_i), R) with a subkey K_i and the xor operation ⊕
- F(.) combines permutation and substitution functions working on 4 bits of data.



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Figure 3.3 Simplified DES Encryption Detail

S-DES: S-Boxes

- The Expansion/Permutation operation: E/P: Bits 4, 1, 2, 3, 2, 3, 4, 1
- Two S-Boxes provide for 4-bit substitution: Bits 1/4 index row, bits 2/3 index column S0

\sim \sim				\sim \sim				
0	1	2	3					
1	0	3	2	0	0	1	2	
3	2	1	0	1	2	0	1	3
0	2	1	3	2	3	0	1	C
3	1	3	2	3	2	1	0	3
	1 3 0	1 0 3 2 0 2	1 0 3 3 2 1 0 2 1	01231032321002133132	1 0 3 2 0 3 2 1 0 1 0 2 1 3 2	1 0 3 2 0 0 3 2 1 0 1 2 0 2 1 3 2 3	1 0 3 2 0 0 1 3 2 1 0 1 2 0 0 2 1 3 2 3 0	1 0 3 2 0 0 1 2 3 2 1 0 1 2 0 1 0 2 1 3 2 1 0 1

S-DES: P-Box and Switch

- The function P4 provides a P-Box: P4: Bits 2, 4, 3, 1
- The Switch function swaps the left and right halves of the data block

Block vs Stream Ciphers

- block ciphers process messages in blocks, each of which is then en/decrypted
- like a substitution on very big characters
 64-bits or more
- stream ciphers process messages a bit or byte at a time when en/decrypting
- many current ciphers are block ciphers

Block Cipher Principles

- block ciphers operate on n bits of plaintext and produce n bits of ciphertext
- block ciphers look like an extremely large substitution
- must be reversible to be able to **decrypt** ciphertext to recover messages efficiently (2ⁿ! mappings)
- arbitrary mapping requires 2ⁿ table entries
- instead use a product cipher of smaller building blocks
- most symmetric block ciphers are based on a Feistel Cipher Structure

Claude Shannon and Substitution-Permutation Ciphers

- in 1949 Claude Shannon introduced idea of substitution-permutation (S-P) networks
 modern substitution-transposition product cipher
- these form the basis of modern block ciphers
- S-P networks are based on the two primitive cryptographic operations we have seen before:
 - *substitution* (S-box)
 - *permutation* (P-box)
- provide *confusion* and *diffusion* of message


Confusion and Diffusion

- cipher needs to completely obscure statistical properties of original message
- a one-time pad does this
- more practically Shannon suggested combining elements to obtain:
- **diffusion** dissipates statistical structure of plaintext over bulk of ciphertext
- **confusion** makes relationship between ciphertext and key as complex as possible

Feistel Cipher Structure

- Horst Feistel devised the Feistel cipher
 based on concept of invertible product cipher
- partitions input block into two halves
 - process through multiple rounds which
 - perform a substitution on left data half
 - based on round function of right half & subkey
 - then have permutation swapping halves
- implements Shannon's substitution-permutation network concept

Feistel Cipher Structure



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
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Ciphertext (2w bits)

Feistel Cipher Design Principles

- block size
 - increasing size improves security, but slows cipher
- key size
 - increasing size improves security, makes exhaustive key searching harder, but may slow cipher
- number of rounds
 - increasing number improves security, but slows cipher
- subkey generation
 - greater complexity can make analysis harder, but slows cipher
- round function
 - greater complexity can make analysis harder, but slows cipher
- fast software en/decryption & ease of analysis
 - are more recent concerns for practical use and testing

Feistel Cipher Decryption



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Data Encryption Standard (DES)

- most widely used block cipher in world
- adopted in 1977 by NBS (now NIST)
 as FIPS PUB 46
- encrypts 64-bit data using 56-bit key
- has widespread use
- has been considerable controversy over its security

DES History


- IBM developed Lucifer cipher
 - by team led by Feistel
 - used 64-bit data blocks with 128-bit key
- then redeveloped as a commercial cipher with input from NSA and others
- in 1973 NBS issued request for proposals for a national cipher standard
- IBM submitted their revised Lucifer which was eventually accepted as the DES

DES Design Controversy

- although DES standard is public
- was considerable controversy over design

 in choice of 56-bit key (vs Lucifer 128-bit)
 and because design criteria were classified
- subsequent events and public analysis show in fact design was appropriate
- DES has become widely used, esp in financial applications

DES Encryption



Initial Permutation IP

- first step of the data computation
- IP reorders the input data bits
- even bits to LH half, odd bits to RH half
- quite regular in structure (easy in h/w)
- see text Table 3.2
- example:

IP(675a6967 5e5a6b5a) = (ffb2194d 004df6fb)


DES Round Structure

- uses two 32-bit L & R halves
- as for any Feistel cipher can describe as:

 $L_i = R_{i-1}$ $R_i = L_{i-1} \text{ xor } F(R_{i-1}, K_i)$

- takes 32-bit R half and 48-bit subkey and:
 - expands R to 48-bits using perm E
 - adds to subkey
 - passes through 8 S-boxes to get 32-bit result
 - finally permutes this using 32-bit perm P

DES Round Structure



Substitution Boxes S

- have eight S-boxes which map 6 to 4 bits
- each S-box is actually 4 little 4 bit boxes
 - outer bits 1 & 6 (**row** bits) select one rows
 - inner bits 2-5 (col bits) are substituted
 - result is 8 lots of 4 bits, or 32 bits
- row selection depends on both data & key
 - feature known as autoclaving (autokeying)
- example:

S(18 09 12 3d 11 17 38 39) = 5fd25e03

DES Key Schedule

- forms subkeys used in each round
- consists of:
 - initial permutation of the key (PC1) which selects 56-bits in two 28-bit halves
 - 16 stages consisting of:
 - selecting 24-bits from each half
 - permuting them by PC2 for use in function f,
 - rotating **each half** separately either 1 or 2 places depending on the **key rotation schedule** K

DES Decryption

- decrypt must unwind steps of data computation
- with Feistel design, do encryption steps again
- using subkeys in reverse order (SK16 ... SK1)
- note that IP undoes final FP step of encryption
- 1st round with SK16 undoes 16th encrypt round
- •
- 16th round with SK1 undoes 1st encrypt round
- then final FP undoes initial encryption IP
- thus recovering original data value

Avalanche Effect

- key desirable property of encryption alg
- where a change of **one** input or key bit results in changing approx **half** output bits
- making attempts to "home-in" by guessing keys impossible
- DES exhibits strong avalanche

Strength of DES – Key Size

- 56-bit keys have $2^{56} = 7.2 \times 10^{16}$ values
- brute force search looks hard
- recent advances have shown is possible
 - in 1997 on Internet in a few months
 - in 1998 on dedicated h/w (EFF) in a few days
 - in 1999 above combined in 22hrs!
- still must be able to recognize plaintext
- now considering alternatives to DES

Strength of DES – Timing Attacks

- attacks actual implementation of cipher
- use knowledge of consequences of implementation to derive knowledge of some/all subkey bits
- specifically use fact that calculations can take varying times depending on the value of the inputs to it
- particularly problematic on smartcards

Strength of DES – Analytic Attacks

- now have several analytic attacks on DES
- these utilise some deep structure of the cipher
 - by gathering information about encryptions
 - can eventually recover some/all of the sub-key bits
 - if necessary then exhaustively search for the rest
- generally these are statistical attacks
- include
 - differential cryptanalysis
 - linear cryptanalysis
 - related key attacks

Differential Cryptanalysis

- one of the most significant recent (public) advances in cryptanalysis
- known by NSA in 70's cf DES design
- Murphy, Biham & Shamir published 1990
- powerful method to analyse block ciphers
- used to analyse most current block ciphers with varying degrees of success
- DES reasonably resistant to it, cf Lucifer

Differential Cryptanalysis

- a statistical attack against Feistel ciphers
- uses cipher structure not previously used
- design of S-P networks has output of function *f* influenced by both input & key
- hence cannot trace values back through cipher without knowing values of the key
- Differential Cryptanalysis compares two related pairs of encryptions

Differential Cryptanalysis Compares Pairs of Encryptions

- with a known difference in the input
- searching for a known difference in output
- when same subkeys are used


$$\Delta m_{i+1} = m_{i+1} \oplus m'_{i+1}$$
$$= \left[m_{i-1} \oplus f(m_i, K_i) \right] \oplus \left[m'_{i-1} \oplus f(m'_i, K_i) \right]$$
$$= \Delta m_{i-1} \oplus \left[f(m_i, K_i) \oplus f(m'_i, K_i) \right]$$

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Differential Cryptanalysis

- have some input difference giving some output difference with probability p
- if find instances of some higher probability input / output difference pairs occurring
- can infer subkey that was used in round
- then must iterate process over many rounds (with decreasing probabilities)

Differential Cryptanalysis



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Differential Cryptanalysis

- perform attack by repeatedly encrypting plaintext pairs with known input XOR until obtain desired output XOR
- when found
 - if intermediate rounds match required XOR have a **right pair**
 - if not then have a **wrong pair**, relative ratio is S/N for attack
- can then deduce keys values for the rounds
 - right pairs suggest same key bits
 - wrong pairs give random values
- for large numbers of rounds, probability is so low that more pairs are required than exist with 64-bit inputs
- Biham and Shamir have shown how a 13-round iterated characteristic can break the full 16-round DES

Linear Cryptanalysis

- another recent development
- also a statistical method
- must be iterated over rounds, with decreasing probabilities
- developed by Matsui et al in early 90's
- based on finding linear approximations
- can attack DES with 2⁴⁷ known plaintexts, still in practise infeasible

Linear Cryptanalysis

• find linear approximations with prob p != ½
 P[i1,i2,...,ia](+)C[j1,j2,...,jb] =
 K[k1,k2,...,kc]

where ia, jb, kc are bit locations in P,C,K

- gives linear equation for key bits
- get one key bit using max likelihood alg
- using a large number of trial encryptions
- effectiveness given by: $|p^{-\frac{1}{2}}|$

Block Cipher Design Principles

- basic principles still like Feistel in 1970's
- number of rounds
 - more is better, exhaustive search best attack
- function f:
 - provides "confusion", is nonlinear, avalanche
- key schedule
 - complex subkey creation, key avalanche

Modes of Operation

- block ciphers encrypt fixed size blocks
- eg. DES encrypts 64-bit blocks, with 56-bit key
- need way to use in practise, given usually have arbitrary amount of information to encrypt
- four were defined for DES in ANSI standard ANSI X3.106-1983 Modes of Use
- subsequently now have 5 for DES and AES
- have block and stream modes


Electronic Codebook Book (ECB)

- message is broken into independent blocks which are encrypted
- each block is a value which is substituted, like a codebook, hence name
- each block is encoded independently of the other blocks

 $C_i = DES_{K1} (P_i)$

• uses: secure transmission of single values

Electronic Codebook Book (ECB)



Advantages and Limitations of ECB

- repetitions in message may show in ciphertext
 - if aligned with message block
 - particularly with data such graphics
 - or with messages that change very little, which become a code-book analysis problem
- weakness due to encrypted message blocks being independent
- main use is sending a few blocks of data


Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)

- message is broken into blocks
- but these are linked together in the encryption operation
- each previous cipher blocks is chained with current plaintext block, hence name
- use Initial Vector (IV) to start process

 $C_i = DES_{K1} (P_i XOR C_{i-1})$ $C_{-1} = IV$

• uses: bulk data encryption, authentication

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)



Advantages and Limitations of CBC

- each ciphertext block depends on **all** message blocks
- thus a change in the message affects all ciphertext blocks after the change as well as the original block
- need Initial Value (IV) known to sender & receiver
 - however if IV is sent in the clear, an attacker can change bits of the first block, and change IV to compensate
 - hence either IV must be a fixed value (as in EFTPOS) or it must be sent encrypted in ECB mode before rest of message
- at end of message, handle possible last short block
 - by padding either with known non-data value (eg nulls)
 - or pad last block with count of pad size
 - eg. [b1 b2 b3 0 0 0 5] <- 3 data bytes, then 5 bytes pad+count


Cipher FeedBack (CFB)

- message is treated as a stream of bits
- added to the output of the block cipher
- result is feed back for next stage (hence name)
- standard allows any number of bit (1,8 or 64 or whatever) to be feed back
 - denoted CFB-1, CFB-8, CFB-64 etc
- is most efficient to use all 64 bits (CFB-64)
 C_i = P_i XOR DES_{K1} (C_{i-1})

 $C_{-1} = IV$

• uses: stream data encryption, authentication

Cipher FeedBack (CFB)



Advantages and Limitations of CFB

- appropriate when data arrives in bits/bytes
- most common stream mode
- limitation is need to stall while do block encryption after every n-bits
- note that the block cipher is used in encryption mode at both ends
- errors propogate for several blocks after the error

Output Feedback (OFB)

- message is treated as a stream of bits
- output of cipher is added to message
- output is then feed back (hence name)
- feedback is independent of message
- can be computed in advance


$$C_i = P_i XOR O_i$$

$$O_i = DES_{K1} (O_{i-1})$$

 $O_{-1} = IV$

• uses: stream encryption over noisy channels

Output Feedback (OFB)




Advantages and Limitations of OFB

- used when error feedback a problem or where need to encryptions before message is available
- superficially similar to CFB
- but feedback is from the output of cipher and is independent of message
- a variation of a Vernam cipher
 - hence must never reuse the same sequence (key+IV)
- sender and receiver must remain in sync, and some recovery method is needed to ensure this occurs
- originally specified with m-bit feedback in the standards
- subsequent research has shown that only **OFB-64** should ever be used

Counter (CTR)

- a "new" mode, though proposed early on
- similar to OFB but encrypts counter value rather than any feedback value
- must have a different key & counter value for every plaintext block (never reused)
 - $C_i = P_i XOR \overline{O_i}$
 - $O_i = DES_{K1}$ (i)
- uses: high-speed network encryptions

Counter (CTR)



Advantages and Limitations of CTR

• efficiency

- can do parallel encryptions
- in advance of need
- good for bursty high speed links
- random access to encrypted data blocks
- provable security (good as other modes)
- but must ensure never reuse key/counter values, otherwise could break (cf OFB)

Summary

- have considered:
- block cipher design principles
- DES
 - details
 - strength
- Differential & Linear Cryptanalysis
- Modes of Operation

 ECB, CBC, CFB, OFB, CTR